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Abstract. Shale gas, a type of natural gas extracted from 
shale rock deposits deep underground, is poised to become 
the latest in a long history of staples industries in the British 
Columbian economy. However, its development poses chal-
lenges for the future trajectory of BC’s economy and society. 
BC’s economy, values, and political imaginary have increas-
ingly turned towards a post-staples trajectory based on 
economic diversification and a cultural shift towards envi-
ronmental and cosmopolitan values. In considering what is 
at stake in the development of shale gas, we locate the indus-
try in the historical context of BC’s economic, regulatory, 
and political transitions toward a post-staples society, and 
assess what political, environmental, and economic chal-
lenges arise from the disconnect between a staples industry 
and a post-staples society. We conclude that for shale gas 
development to be viable and profitable for BC’s economy, 
the industry must be regulated to ensure the benefits that 
accrue from shale gas development (in terms of revenue, 
sustainable employment, and stable northern development) 
further BC’s nascent post-staples trajectory of development. 
 










Résumé. Le gaz de schiste, un type de gaz naturel extrait de 
dépôts de schiste en profondeur, est en passe de devenir le 
dernier dans une longue histoire d’industries de matières 
premières, dans l’économie de la Colombie Britannique 
(C.B.). Cependant, son développement suscite des défis pour 
la trajectoire future de l’économie et de la société de la C.B. 
L’économie, les valeurs et l’imaginaire politique de la C.B. se 
sont tournés de manière croissante vers une voie post-
matières premières, basée sur une diversification écono-
mique postindustrielle et une mutation culturelle incluant 
des valeurs post-matérialistes, environnementalistes et 
cosmopolites. En prenant en compte ce qui est en jeu dans le 
développement du gaz de schiste, nous situons l’industrie 
dans le contexte historique des transitions économiques, 
régulatrices et politiques de la C.B. face à une société post-
matières premières, et évaluons quels défis politiques, envi-
ronnementaux et économiques se présentent par la suite, liés 
au fossé qui sépare une société de matières premières et une 
société post-matières premières. Nous concluons que, afin 
d’être une ressource durable et profitable pour l’économie de 
la C.B., l’industrie doit être régulée dans le but que les béné-
fices tirés de son développement (en termes de revenus, 
d’emplois durables et de développement et d’emploi au 
nord) puisse être utilisé afin d’approfondir cette trajectoire 
de développement 
 
Mots clefs. société post-matières premières; gaz de schiste; 





Since 2010, shale gas1 has emerged as a pressing issue in 
British Columbia (BC). With extensive gas discoveries 
throughout the northeast corner of the province, it appears 
that a lucrative new staple could soon be playing a major role 
in BC’s economy. If shale gas is to be a new staple industry in 
BC, it will be part of a long history of natural resource indus-
tries that have fuelled development since the early days of 
province-building. Indeed, staples – including forestry, fish 
and minerals – played a driving role in the provincial econ-
omy in the post-war era, creating jobs and royalty revenues 
that drove the provincial economy, leading to secondary job 
creation in the service and manufacturing sectors, as well as 
financing a steadily increasing amount of public spending on 
infrastructure and public institutions. Its proponents prom-
ise that shale gas could continue this legacy of staples fueling 
the BC economy: BC is thought to have large reserves of 
shale gas and is in the process of rapidly developing the 
resource. Located in the north-eastern Peace River and 
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Northern Rockies regions of the province, four shale gas 
reserves, or plays, have been discovered thus far: the Mont-
ney Play, the Cordova Embayment, the Laird Basin and the 
Horn River Basin. The BC Energy Plan cites “undiscovered 
resource estimates” of 250 trillion cubic feet (tcf) of shale gas 
in BC; by comparison, it estimates only 98 tcf of convention-
al gas (BC Ministry of Energy, Mines and Petroleum Re-
sources, 2007: 32). Currently, exploitation of shale gas in BC 
is just getting under way, with 425 billion cubic feet, or 39 
percent of all natural gas production in BC coming from 
unconventional gas in 2008 (Adams 2010). However with 
several large-scale LNG-related infrastructure projects al-
ready approved, in addition to rapid growth in royalties 
generated from the sale of drilling rights,2 it appears that a 
major commercial production boom is underway.  
However, this shale gas boom coincides with a changing 
economic and political imaginary for BC – one which will 
change what is at stake for the province in the development 
of a new staple. Today, BC is characterized by an economic 
base increasingly rooted in the service sector; a new type of 
regulatory regime, with the state-centric Fordist-Keynesian 
model replaced by neoliberalism; and a shifting normative 
political landscape animated by environmental, urban, and 
post-material concerns that are often antithetical to tradi-
tional staples industries (Hutton 2008; Harrison 1996). 
Poised in this way to embark on a post-staples trajectory of 
economic development,3 BC has already undergone a nor-
mative shift towards a post-staples political imaginary—
whereby post-material, urban, global, and cosmopolitan 
values destabilize and even transcend the leading role once 
played by staples within dominant narratives of BC economy 
and society (Hutton 2008; Harrison 1996; Rayner and How-
lett 2008)4. In this altered context, the impact of shale gas 
on the political economy of BC is unclear. Politically. framing 
shale gas as an industry that coheres with that political im-
aginary will be different and more challenging than in previ-
ous staples booms during which staple industries not only 
fitted within, but defined the political imaginary of the prov-
ince. Contrasted with the post-war Keynesian era, when a 
vibrant forestry sector drove the economy, the province is no 
longer highly dependent on the vitality of one industry, and 
may now possess greater agency to set the terms of engage-
ment for development of a particular resource. At the same 
time, in its transition away from Fordist-Keynesianism, BC 
has also moved away from a willingness to enact regulatory 
regimes that set robust terms of engagement for staple in-
dustries.  
We argue that a new regulatory model is needed to en-
sure that resource development is consistent with the nas-
cent post-staples trajectory of the province: development 
must be economically, socially and environmentally sustain-
able. In the absence of such a regulatory regime, we antici-
pate significant resistance to the development of the industry 
that may in turn affect the industry’s competitiveness. We 
begin by locating shale gas in the historical context of BC 
political economy, examining BC’s transition away from an 
earlier era of staples-led economic development, a Fordist-
Keynesian regulatory regime, and a staples political imagi-
nary. We observe how structural conditions have con-
strained or catalyzed certain trajectories of development in 
the past, and how both the state and civil society have trans-
formed those structures. This analysis enables us to antici-
pate structural constraints that will evolve out of provincial 
decisions on shale gas, producing economic and political 
realities that will either frustrate or reinforce a post-staples 
trajectory for the province. We conclude with a considera-
tion of both challenges to and potentials for shale gas devel-
opment to compliment the province’s post-staples trajectory. 
 




The past half-century has seen a dramatic shift in the struc-
ture of BC’s economy. Although they remain important 
today, natural resources—traditionally wood and minerals, 
more recently oil and gas—have declined as a proportion of 
provincial employment and Gross Provincial Product (GPP)5 
(Ministry of Finance 2010; Thorpe and Sandberg 2008). 
While the early era of classical staples development involved 
an economy heavily centered on raw staples extraction with-
out much of a role for the service sector or value-added 
industries, this changed by the end of the Second World 
War. The finite nature of BC’s resources, coupled with the 
expansion of the service sector, drove the staples economy 
into a new era. Howlett and Brownsey (2001) argue that by 
the mid-1960s, the provincial economy had entered a new 
staples phase marked by depleted resource endowments; 
increased capital-intensiveness in resource extraction; the 
development of secondary processing of resources; economic 
diversification, particularly with the growth of manufactur-
ing and the service sector; and growing pressure from the 
environmental movement against unbridled resource extrac-
tion. This shift marked both a development of the staples 
industries, as they became more technologically advanced 
and knowledge-intensive, and the growing importance of 
other economic sectors. Overall, the shift can be understood 
as both the advancement – into a more knowledge and tech-
nology-intensive phase that cohered with other elements of 
late-capitalism – and the decline – through the shrinking 
relative importance of staples industries to the economy – of 
the traditional staples economy (Howlett and Brownsey 
2001).6 
Despite its early and continued importance, the staples 
economy has endured adversity since the 1980s, as a series 
of negative global market and local environmental condi-
tions have severely compromised the forestry and mining 
industries. Forestry and mining employment declined by 25 
and 50 percent respectively between 1980 and 1999 (Young 
2008: 10). However, just as forestry faltered,7 BC’s oil and 
gas exports began to grow substantially: the value of BC’s 
exports of natural gas and oil approached $4 billion by 2005, 
up from half a billion in 1996, with much of this growth a 
consequence of the development of new (predominantly 
shale) natural gas fields in the Peace River area (Barman, 
2007: 363).  
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Clearly, shale gas holds the potential to fill the void left 
by the decline of forestry. However, insofar as BC’s economy 
has transitioned into a mature or even post-staples state, it is 
unclear how – or even whether – that void needs be filled. 
BC is moving into a post-staples phase, where its economy is 
increasingly dominated by the service sector (Howlett and 
Brownsey 2001). Consequently, and in tune with a post-
staples political imaginary, the province is witnessing growth 
in tourism, information technology, and other high-tech and 
service-sector jobs characteristic of a post-staples economy. 
Both the normative and structural transformations taking 
place potentially give the province greater agency in charting 
the course of shale gas development. 
 
Regulatory history 
While comparisons between the post-war forest economy – 
which helped drive a prolonged period of accumulation and 
province-building until the 1980s – and shale gas today may 
be enticing, shale gas is developing within a fundamentally 
different regulatory regime. Specifically, the regulatory 
structure of BC’s political economy has undergone a shift 
from Fordist-Keynesianism to neoliberalism, as indicated by 
the political ideologies of governing parties who have em-
braced global shifts away from embedded liberalism towards 
neoliberalism. The 1950s-70s marked an era of Fordist-
Keynesianism under the Social Credit regime (with a brief 
period of NDP governance under David Barrett from 1972 to 
1975). Their approach was pro-business and anti-labour, yet 
relied on a large state that invested heavily in public infra-
structure and implemented comprehensive regulatory poli-
cies to ensure profitable conditions for business; ensure 
stable, prosperous conditions for workers; and prioritize 
resource development in the provincial hinterlands to indus-
trialize the North of the province (Howlett and Brownsey 
1996).8 The use by Social Credit governments of a variety of 
regulatory policies to ensure that staples industries would 
fuel province-wide development and growth in the past 
garnered sufficient support from civil society to ensure that 
its reach did not extend beyond the normative political imag-
inary.  
The Social Credit regulatory regime succeeded in indus-
trializing parts of the resource hinterland of BC, but only 
precariously. In mandating resource companies to invest in 
community development, this approach created dependancy 
on single resources and individual companies (Howlett and 
Brownsey 1996). The extensive regulation needed to achieve 
ongoing development proved to be a significant burden, as 
BC was forced to deal with many of the same problems 
plaguing other Fordist-Keynesian regimes in the early 
1980s9, spurring change. Beginning with the “restraint pro-
gram” of the Social Credit party in 1982, and continuing 
through today with the neoliberal regime of the Liberal 
party, BC has shifted to a regulatory regime that involves 
decreased public expenditures, minimal regulations, privati-
zation, and liberalization. In the forestry and mining sectors, 
the Liberal government has utilized a comprehensive strate-
gy of liberalization, along with the shift to “‘results-based’ 
environmental regulation” (Young and Matthews, 2007: 
181).  
This regulatory history of BC staples does not provide us 
with an appropriate regulatory precedent for the shale gas 
boom. The Fordist-Keynesian regime of the Social Credit era 
benefited from conditions that are not present today: appar-
ent resource abundance; the post-war boom; ever-growing 
demand; an economic upswing, in terms of the rate of profit, 
and an economic context that meant that the Keynesian 
welfare state was still profitable. Moreover, it was located 
within a different political imaginary, wherein province-
building, wealth creation and industrialization overshad-
owed other concerns based on post-material, cosmopolitan, 
global, urban, and environmental values (Hutton 2008; 
Rayner and Howlett 2008). Without these conditions today, 
it is clear that such a regime is not viable. Rather, this histo-
ry reminds us that regulatory regimes and structural con-
strains have both constrained and catalyzed development 
trajectories in the past. How we choose to regulate shale gas 
will likewise impose a series of structural constraints that 




While the historical context demonstrates the structural 
constraints posed by a staples paradigm to BC’s economy, 
the history of land- and resource-use struggles in BC sug-
gests that shale gas development could be beset by problems 
if it fails achieve a social licence to operate. In the past, re-
sistance to certain land-use decisions and forestry practices 
has been strong and sustained, drawing international atten-
tion, and often forcing the hand of provincial governments.10 
The provincial state has used both coercion and persuasion 
to settle these matters, but the overarching issues have never 
gone away and will re-emerge if the concerns of key groups – 
in particular First Nations and environmentalists – are not 
addressed in the decision-making process.  
For example, we can look to several key junctures in BC 
politics that have had significant implications for the eco-
nomic trajectory of the province, such as the Solidarity Coa-
lition’s struggle against the Social Credit “restraint program” 
of the early 1980s, and the “war in the woods” conflict over 
logging rights in the late 1980s and early 1990s (Carroll and 
Ratner 1989; Wilson 1998; Hayter 2003). Resistance to 
Social Credit policies of restraint in the early 1980s marked 
the starting point of an era of political turmoil in BC. During 
this struggle, the Solidarity Coalition was largely animated 
by the pursuit of material gains. Later struggles have driven 
the province in a post-staples direction, fighting for post-
material values, rather than the material basis of labour 
politics. In the aftermath of the 1980s recession, BC was 
rocked by a new era of politicized resource development 
struggles, known as the “war in the woods” in which gov-
ernment, forestry companies, and forestry unions came to be 
“increasingly in conflict both with a rapidly growing envi-
ronmental movement, and also with BC’s First Nations, who 
began to challenge the provincial government over its rights 
to grant harvesting leases over what they regarded as tradi-
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tional communal tribal resources” (Jackson and Curry, 
2004a: 29). The war in the woods galvanized support for 
post-material, non-economic values and concerns, and thus 
played a significant role in BC’s transition toward a post-
staples political imaginary.  
Understanding the political responses to such resistance 
will help us identify how resistance to shale gas development 
might emerge, and might be managed in a way that is con-
sistent with a post-staples political society. For example, we 
can learn from how, in mediating the “war in the woods” 
following its return to power in 1991, the NDP sought to 
institute democratic, participatory, devolved, and consensus-
based decision-making practices around land-use issues. 
This was done most prominently with regard to the Comis-
sion on Resources and Environment (CORE) process that 
emerged out of the Clayoquot Sound conflict. The CORE 
process “[went] beyond mere consultation with competing 
interests and actually devolve[d] some authority over policy-
making to a group of stakeholders. Rather than the majority 
rule common to legislatures, these new bodies operate[d] 
under a decision rule of consensus” (Hoberg 1996: 275). 
CORE negotiations were unable to deliver the far-reaching 
consensus-based reform that many hoped, but indicate the 
potential of breaking with traditional regulatory and man-
agement processes – in this case, pursuing consensus-
building rather than the adversarial politics that had charac-
terized disputes between logging companies and environ-
mentalists in past decades. Moreover, the CORE process 
signalled the prominent role environmental groups and First 
Nations were to play in provincial politics and land-use 
negotiations. It thus marked an institutionalization of the 
post-staples political imaginary into BC politics and the 
policy-making process, further entrenching the normativity 
of this growing political current.  
The BC Liberals (since their return to power in 2001) 
have revised strategies for making overtures to First Nations 
and environmental groups, trading this deliberative demo-
cratic approach to land and resource issues (Carroll and 
Ratner 2005) for a neoliberal policy turn that has sought 
increasingly market-oriented relations with local communi-
ties and First Nations. For example, they have sought to 
advance a neoliberal discourse within First Nations treaty 
negotiations, as evidenced in the (much maligned) 2002 
referendum, which Wood and Rossiter see as “a neo-liberal 
political-economic discourse that aspires to recast Aboriginal 
citizenship in British Columbia in such a way as to render 
the historical geographies of colonialism that frame it irrele-
vant and to instead envision First Nation’s full inclusion in 
BC society as centred on participation in the ‘free’ market 
economy” (2005: 353). This approach has drawn criticism, 
especially where it has resulted in government overriding 
First Nations communities on land use decisions: for exam-
ple, in 2004, the Liberal government overrode the will of 
Tlingit First Nations, and a pending Supreme Court appeal 
to allow mining company Redfern to build gold, zinc, and 
copper mines in an endangered wildlife zone in Atlin, 
Northwest BC (Smith 2005). However, in their second term 
the Liberals have advanced a new brand of neoliberal pro-
environmental policy again framed against BC’s post-staples 
political imaginary. For example, Hoberg notes that “in 
February 2007, the province released a new energy plan 
whose spirit is significantly different from its predecessor’s. 
The 2002 plan was focused on privatization and regulatory 
reform; the 2007 plan was focused on environmental leader-
ship through climate mitigation and self-sufficiency in ener-
gy supply” (2010: 346). Moreover, the Liberals have said 
they intend to substantially reduce GHG emissions over the 
next forty years, through such measures as a carbon tax, a 
clean energy fund for green development projects, a carbon 
offset mechanism called the Pacific Carbon Trust, and an 
ambitious 2010 target of carbon neutrality in all public 
buildings (Smith 2010). Nonetheless, the shale gas boom 
appears poised to raise significant challenges for this neolib-
eral environmentalism of the BC Liberals. While the Liberals 
have gained from pursuing a green agenda with the support 
of some environmental groups, and have quelled some of the 
tension between state and civil society over resource issues, 
shale gas development risks reinvigorating resistance (for 
reasons we explore in the following section).  
The political history of BC shows us how the agency of 
key groups in civil society has played a role in shaping the 
trajectory of BC’s political economy in recent decades. The 
struggles of environmentalists and First Nations have been 
both causes and consequences of the growing normativity of 
a post-staples political imaginary. 11 Insofar as BC is increas-
ingly constituted through post-material, environmentalist, 
and urban political narratives, their struggles will only serve 
to reinforce the notion that the structural and ideological 
mechanisms behind staples economies are out of tune with 
BC society. Moreover, as First Nations realize increasing 
amounts of agency and political legitimacy with regard to 
land claims (Tollefson et al, 2008: 170), the legal and politi-
cal consequences incurred by government resistance to the 
institutionalization of these rights will only increase. The 
regulatory approach to shale gas must, therefore, formulate 
a decision-making process for shale gas development that 
fosters, rather than frustrates cooperation between govern-
ment and the environmental and First Nations resistance 
movements.  
 
Challenges of staples development in a post-
staples society 
 
If the above discussion shows how the province has transi-
tioned away from the structural economic, regulatory, and 
normative political conditions that together constituted a 
staples society, it also shows how that shift has been actively 
shaped by political movements. The problem of a resource 
industry suited to historical social, political, and economic 
conditions that are no longer present can only be overcome if 
the industry coheres with the new contexts it seeks to inhab-
it. Consequently, if the industry is to cohere with BC’s post-
staples trajectory, it must actively respond to the political, 
environmental, and economic challenges it faces. Otherwise, 
the industry will find itself pulled into the ideological strug-
gle over BC’s identity, facing a resistance movement that has 
already shown its capacity to force the hand of industry and 
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government, for example through the war in the woods. By 
working towards a robust regulatory regime capable of meet-
ing the specific political, environmental and economic chal-
lenges the industry poses to BC’s post-staples trajectory, the 
province can avert this political struggle. The following 
section considers the specific political, environmental, and 
economic challenges it must overcome, and how the industry 
might be managed so as to ensure that it reinforces BC’s 
post-staples trajectory of development. 
 
Political challenges 
Shale gas faces a number of political issues that must be 
addressed if its development is to take place in a way that 
coheres with BC’s post-staples political imaginary. The wan-
ing strength of organized labour mitigates the extent to 
which this could be the sort of struggle that “splits the left” 
between labour on one hand, and environmentalists and 
First Nations on the other. Both the growing concern about 
climate change and the province’s declining dependence on 
natural resources play into the hands of the latter two 
groups. Unless government is accountable to these concerns, 
groups that have helped push BC society into a post-staples 
normative paradigm will feel cheated by a government that 
has otherwise been responsive to this normative shift. Al-
ready, there are signs of discontent from independent MLAs 
Vicki Huntington and Bob Simpson, who have voiced the 
environmental, political, economic and health concerns of 
local communities, environmentalists, public institutions, 
and First Nations, calling for a “comprehensive inquiry into 
the public policy and cumulative impact implications of this 
development” (Simpson and Huntington 2011). 
 
First Nations challenges 
Specifically addressing concerns for First Nations rights, 
Huntington and Simpson’s letter states that “First Nations 
rights and title issues still need to be addressed, especially 
now with the expiry on March 31 of [2011] of Consultation 
Process Agreements between the Oil and Gas Commission 
and First Nations in the Peace Region.” In addressing this 
problem, the BC Oil and Gas Commission [OGC] intends to: 
“continue to actively engage First Nations in consultations 
on oil and gas development,” further seeking to develop 
“agreement implementation strategies through regular 
meetings with Chiefs and Councils and collaborative activi-
ties with community land offices,” and “examine innovative 
solutions for the effective participation of First Nations in 
the review and assessment of projects” (OGC 2011: 12). With 
regard to environmental concerns, the OGC intends to “con-
tinue the development and coordination with First Nations, 
producers, and appropriate stakeholders, of basin-specific 
environmental stewardship plans, operating protocols and 
value maps” (OGC 2011: 13). While these overtures may be 
good politics, it is unclear whether they will be enough to 
quell opposition to shale gas development, and its environ-
mental, health, and infrastructural implications, among First 
Nations throughout the province. For the industry to expand, 
it must build pipelines to the west coast through the unceded 
traditional territories of First Nations. Resistance to oil 
pipelines is mobilizing solidarity from First Nations across 
the north of the province (Coastal First Nations 2010; Tait 
and Vanderklippe 2011), although it remains unclear wheth-
er similar resistance will emerge to gas pipelines.12 If it does, 
this  resistance coupled with the deterioration of positive 
relations between First Nations and the provincial govern-
ment and the growing normative legal paradigm indigenous 
rights globally make it possible that First Nations’ opposition 
could be a significant obstacle to the industry. Even if re-
sistance to pipeline development does not emerge, however, 
given the extensive impacts the industry is having on First 
Nations’ territory, it must find a way to more effectively 
engage First Nations in the decision-making process. 
 
Environmental impacts 
Environmental leadership makes up an important compo-
nent of BC’s post-staples political imaginary, and the indus-
try will have to overcome major challenges to quell growing 
opposition from BC’s environmental community. Shale gas 
poses unique environmental problems at both the local and 
global scales. Managing locally groundwater contamination, 
water consumption, and cumulative landscape-level and 
health impacts could be problematic for both industry and 
government (Osborn et al 2011; Parfitt 2010, 2011). Major 
shale producing regions elsewhere have experienced 
groundwater contamination from spills of fracturing fluid 
containing known carcinogens (Lustgarten 2001), and anec-
dotal reports of direct contamination by methane or fractur-
ing fluids from the fracking process have been a cause for 
widespread concern. The magnitude of risk remains contest-
ed and little peer-reviewed research has investigated con-
cerns. However, early findings have not alleviated concerns: 
a recent peer-reviewed scientific study published in PNAS 
found that methane contamination of groundwater in-
creased with proximity to shale gas hydrofracturing opera-
tions in test sites in New York and Pensylvania, and was 
chemically consistent with a thermogenic origin in deep 
shale formations but inconsistent with biogenic surface 
decomposition (Osborn et al 2011). Such contamination 
poses a range of health and safety hazards including explo-
sion (Osborn et al 2011). BC’s shale gas fields are remote, 
and contamination concerns are not equivalent to those 
experienced in regions like the New York City watershed, 
where fracking has been heavily debated and is currently 
under a moratorium. However, the health concerns associat-
ed with hydraulic fracturing have been enough to prompt a 
study by the BC Ministry of Health (Hume 2011). Water 
consumption also remains a major concern, as the hydraulic 
fracturing process uses massive quantities of water. Parfitt 
(2010: 26) found that BC shale gas producers hold permits 
to withdraw 274,946 cubic meters of water daily, more than 
double the capital city Greater Victoria’s daily level of con-
sumption (132,282 cubic meters). Water issues in relation to 
shale gas extraction in the northeast arose in 2010, when the 
region experienced a serious drought and many of the water 
sources used by industry experienced low water levels (Par-
fitt 2010: 19). Where sufficient water is available, it will still 
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become high volumes of toxic waste upon the completion of 
its useful role in fracking, posing additional risks for sur-
rounding ecosystems. If these landscape environmental 
impacts cannot be mitigated sufficiently, shale gas develop-
ment may incite resistance from northern communities, who 
already experience resentment and alienation from the 
metropolitan south of the province (Markey et al 2007; 
Brownsey et al 2010), not to mention a growing coalition of 
local, provincial, and global environmental groups (Hume 
2011). 
 
Shale gas and the climate challenge 
Beyond local concerns, shale gas development poses a major 
challenge to the values of a province accustomed to identify-
ing itself as a leader on climate change mitigation policy, 
with robust emissions targets and a continent-leading car-
bon tax. To fit within this environmental leadership narra-
tive, the industry must be capable of contributing to – rather 
than hindering - the BC government’s pledges to substantial-
ly reduce CO2 emissions, with binding targets of 33 percent 
by 2020 and 80 percent by 2050 (British Columbia Ministry 
of Environment 2010). Shale gas is not naturally positioned 
to further BC’s emissions reductions plan: according to 
Jaccard and Griffin, “shale gas development would increase 
provincial emissions by almost 10 percent relative to where 
they should be in 2020 under the legislated emissions tar-
get”, meaning that “if BC is to achieve its GHG emission 
target while pursuing shale gas development, it will need to 
reduce emissions throughout the economy by almost 50 
percent from where they would otherwise have been in 
2020” (2010: 5). If shale gas is to be developed further, the 
province must mandate use of the best available emissions 
reductions technologies, including carbon capture and stor-
age, if it is to meet its emissions reductions targets (Jaccard 
and Griffin 2010).  
While direct greenhouse gas emissions of production are 
raising environmental concerns, the lifecycle emissions of 
shale gas may ultimately generate greater resistance and 
undermine the sustainability-oriented focus of BC’s post-
staples political imaginary. Although the development of a 
fossil fuel industry is usually tied to an increased carbon 
impact, recent declarations that natural gas could be a clean 
alternative to coal and oil (IEA 2011) suggest that the indus-
try could potentially be part of the green economic develop-
ment strategy mandated by BC’s post-staples political para-
digm. However, the climate impacts of shale gas remain 
deeply contested. The IEA report also noted that shale gas 
contributes to 3.5% - 12% higher greenhouse emissions than 
conventional gas (2011, 64). The only peer-reviewed aca-
demic report on lifecyle shale gas emissions available at the 
time of publication, by Howarth et al (2011), suggests shale 
gas emissions could be comparable to coal over a 100 years 
time scale and worse than coal over a 20 year time scale. 
While there remains great uncertainty over the greenhouse 
gas impacts of shale gas, even a significant downward revi-
sion may not mitigate emissions concerns stemming from 
BC shale gas development. There is little potential for do-
mestic consumption of the resource, and the two likely ex-
port destinations – Alberta and East Asia13 – exacerbate 
emissions concerns. Exporting to East Asia would require 
liquification, oceanic shipping and regasification, which can 
significantly increase the emissions profile of natural gas, 
compromising the credibility of cross-Pacific export as a 
sustainable option. Exporting BC shale gas to Alberta to fuel 
oil sands development would be the worst case scenario for 
GHG mitigation, with unconventional gas (which entails 
increased emissions over conventional gas) fueling develop-
ment of unconventional oil (which entails increased emis-
sions over conventional oil). This option may generate sig-
nificant resistance from the already well-entrenched anti-oil 
sands movement. Shipment to the Pacific Northwest could 
offer benefits in offsetting coal for electricity generation, but 
BC suppliers would face stiff competition from domestic 
American producers (Terasen 2010). With no natural path 
for BC’s shale gas to be consumed in a way that clearly miti-
gates (rather than exacerbates) climate change, the shale gas 
industry may face significant resistance on the grounds of 
entrenching a fossil-fuel paradigm inconsistent with British 
Columbians’ contemporary vision for their province. 
 
Economic challenges 
Finding a profitable market for shale gas that will not incur 
significant resistance on environmental grounds is one chal-
lenge, but so too is finding a profitable market. Investors and 
producers face localized geographical and technological 
constraints to development alongside non-local price and 
market instability. The economic return on shale gas, a 
relative newcomer to the international energy market, re-
mains ambiguous, and natural gas has always been seen as a 
riskier investment than coal because of price fluctuations 
(Kitasei 2011). While proponents believe the current low 
price of natural gas will help maintain high demand, weak 
commodity prices have forced operators to work with small 
margins. Some analysts have questioned whether the eco-
nomic competitiveness of the shale gas industry is over-
blown, amounting to “a logistical, geological, environmental, 
and financial pipe dream” (Hughes 2011: 1). A recent New 
York Times investigation turned up hundreds of emails and 
internal documents raising the question of whether the 
American shale gas industry is “inherently unprofitable,” a 
major departure from promises of abundant cheap energy 
(Urbina 2011: A1). We do not yet know whether such ques-
tions represent real risks to the shale gas boom, and cannot 
anticipate how such concerns will play out in the BC indus-
try. However, they do indicate sources of uncertainty.  
Most notably, it remains unclear whether BC will benefit 
from stable market access for its natural gas exports. Shale 
gas is being discovered all over the world, and although 
demand seems to be enormous – particularly as countries 
shift away from coal, which still accounts for almost 30 
percent of global energy output (Kitasei 2011) – supply may 
be equally vast, especially in some of the heaviest coal-using 
jurisdictions, such as China and the United States (EIA 
2010). Advances in technology and changes in policy direc-
tion will also impact the appeal of shale gas. Given the lim-
ited demand for natural gas within BC, the province will be 
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reliant on energy policies in other jurisdictions to render BC 
natural gas profitable in the long term. If BC or its export 
partners suddenly face strong resistance to shale gas devel-
opment or use, this will further destabilize the industry. 
These economic challenges and risks to industry will be 
externalized onto the province, through lower revenue 
streams, lost investment, and decreased or destabilized 
employment. 
This reliance on exports risks entrenching or renewing 
an era of dependency in which low-value raw staples de-
signed for export (for which the province has little domestic 
use) dominate the economy. This economic profile could 
push the province into a “staples trap,” whereby dependency 
on the vitality of the industry structures a wide range of 
social, political, economic, and environmental policies, and 
the strength of the provincial economy is tied to economic 
conditions in a small number of export markets, such as 
China or Japan. For example, the oil sands have brought 
Alberta thousands of jobs and hundreds of billions of dollars 
of investment; the province’s GPP per capita is now far 
greater than that of any other province. Yet Alberta has 
grown dependent on the oil sands, a resource that faces its 
own risks, including price fluctuations, if the price of a barrel 
of oil drops as it did by more than 75 percent in the second 
half of 200814; the risk of unpredictable demand, if export 
markets enact emissions standards affecting investment; 
and changing regulatory patterns, if the state takes a differ-
ent approach to environmental policy that would make some 
investments unprofitable. In Alberta – and consequently in 
Canada as a whole – the state and society have grown de-
pendent on this resource, and the particular risks that plague 
bitumen have become risks for Canada as a whole, including 
the risk of the currency becoming a petrodollar tied to the 
price of a barrel of oil (Smith 2011). Moreover, bold 
measures that challenge the industry, such as drastically 
reducing emissions at the national level, have become much 
more complicated, and environmental regulation has be-
come increasingly difficult. We see the challenges this poses 
with the rise of resistance to the oil sands, including efforts 
on the part of the EU to ban oil sands products (McLellan 
2011; Harvey 2011). The rigidity of the industry is inherently 
problematic, not only for the environment and residents, but 
for the industry itself.  
 
Economic opportunities 
To mitigate the economic risks of (and to) the industry, BC 
urgently needs a comprehensive regulatory regime. A regula-
tory approach that settles for minimal royalties and low 
regulatory standards – like that taken with respect to the 
Alberta oil sands – would be both irrational and irresponsi-
ble for a province that has managed well without a large 
fossil fuel industry and is seeking to become a leader in 
climate change mitigation. Yet BC appears poised to embark 
on just such an approach to its shale gas industry. For exam-
ple, its natural gas royalties closely match Alberta’s, and 
indicators for royalty maximization must take Alberta as 
BC’s main competitor (OGC 2010: 6-7). Given the early 
stages of this industry and decline in dependence on staples, 
BC may have an increased capacity to set the terms of en-
gagement before it is too late, and the province is already 
“locked in” to development through fixed infrastructure, 
investment and production conditions. Developing a com-
prehensive regulatory regime may stifle investment in the 
short term, but it will ensure long term stability, environ-
mental and political responsibility, and widespread public 
benefits. However, those benefits must cohere with the post-
staples paradigm which BC inhabits, bringing public reve-
nue, sustainable investment and development, and advanc-
ing economic diversification and independence, rather than 
staples dependency. This section will consider the potential 
for a robust regulatory regime to achieve such a trajectory by 
supporting revenue, sustainable investment, and sustainable 
northern development and employment growth. If these 
benefits can be realized, then the industry may yet play a role 
in fostering the expansion of BC’s post-staples trajectory, 
and may consequently enjoy the normative political legiti-
macy that comes with it. 
Despite BC’s history of relatively low royalty rates (see, 
for example, Thorpe and Sandberg 2008: 194), shale gas has 
the potential to be a major source of revenue for the prov-
ince. Given that this resource belongs to all of British Co-
lumbia – it is located in Crown lands – the citizens of BC 
have legitimate claim to a fair share of revenues generated 
through royalties that can be cycled through the provincial 
state, enabling investment in social programs, green tech-
nology and infrastructure development, or even tax cuts. 
Indeed, while provincial royalties have never been high, they 
were necessary to fund the province-building of the Social 
Credit era. Yet the province faces a dilemma in ensuring that 
shale gas can be a revenue boon without scaring off invest-
ment, a concern that is further complicated by other geo-
graphical and infrastructural constraints facing the industry, 
such as its extreme distance from export markets. Moreover, 
the province must consider how much investment it is will-
ing to sacrifice for a fair share of royalties.  
BC should carefully examine its regulatory options and 
seek inspiration (and cautionary tales) from other jurisdic-
tions. Some energy-producing states have reaped enormous 
revenues from oil and gas, whilst ensuring that the resource 
remains appealing for investors. For example, Norway’s 
offshore oil industry has made a significant contribution to 
the overall economy without undermining the country’s 
post-staples political imaginary, or complicating the devel-
opment of a diversified, post-industrial economy. According 
to Thurber et al, “Norway has made a point of administering 
its petroleum resources using three distinct government 
bodies: a national oil company (NOC) engaged in commer-
cial hydrocarbon operations; a government ministry to help 
set policy; and a regulatory body to provide oversight and 
technical expertise” (2010: 4) Norway’s heritage fund, set up 
in 1990, had generated over $570 billion by 2010.15 Con-
versely, Alberta has generated little of its own revenue from 
oil and gas development, yet this has enabled the oil sands to 
be developed at unprecedented speed and levels of invest-
ment (Nikiforuk 2010). Set up in 1976, Alberta’s heritage 
fund had only generated 15 billion dollars in revenue for the 
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province by 2010 (Finn 2008; Government of Alberta 2011). 
Clearly, Norway has found a way to ensure its offshore oil 
can be both a profitable investment for industry, and a major 
source of revenue for the public good, providing a vast pool 
of wealth for when the oil runs out.  
If shale gas holds as much promise for the BC economy 
as its proponents advertise, it would be wise to learn from 
such examples, to see what elements of their regulatory and 
royalty approach BC might benefit from. Abrupt shocks to 
BC’s forestry and mineral sectors in the early 1980s – and 
the sporadic, slow decline witnessed since – have demon-
strated the value of an insurance policy to deal with the 
eventual decline of a resource, and a regulatory regime that 
borrowed from the Norwegian model would do much to 
provide that insurance, as well as provide a steady stream of 
revenue with which to fund the further development of BC’s 
post-staples economy and society. Updating and enacting a 
royalty plan could be an important next step for BC, given 
the current state of royalties from natural gas. Even though 
oil and gas investment has grown from $1 billion in 1997 to 
$3.4 billion in 2000 to a high of $7.3 billion in 2005 ($5.9 
billion in 2007), royalties have gone from $1.25 billion in 
2000/01 to $1.9 billion in 2005-06, to $1.1 billion in 2007-
08 ($406 million in 2009-10) (BC Stats 2010a, 2010b; Min-
istry of Finance 2010: 72). That marks nearly a fifty percent 
decline in royalties as a percentage of investment during the 
Liberal Party’s tenure, from 37 percent in 2000 to 19 percent 
in 2007.  
In addition to provincial revenue, shale gas presents an 
opportunity for inward investment in the industry and in the 
BC economy. To avoid relations of dependency on large 
transnational corporations, and promote sustainable in-
vestment, the province must regulate investment so as to 
promote economic diversification and sovereignty, rather 
than re-entrench staples dependency. Major foreign corpo-
rations have begun investing in BC shale gas, including 
South Africa’s Sasol, Japan’s Mitsubishi and Chubu Electric, 
Malaysia’s Petronas, and China’s PetroChina16 (CBC News 
2011a, 2011b; Jones 2011; Japan Today 2011). While this 
may be indicative of the perceived profitability of the indus-
try and will likely bring stable investment, given the size of 
these corporations we must be concerned as to whether it 
will it bring another chapter in the long history of foreign 
investment undermining sovereignty by limiting the state’s 
capacity to impose stricter regulations (Gill 2008). The 
increased mobility of these TNCs enables them to “vote with 
their feet” (Sassen 1996: 42), moving large sums of invest-
ment out of one political jurisdiction, thus disciplining the 
regulatory regime by withdrawing investment and jobs. 
While this is less of a concern in industries that require a 
large amount of fixed capital investment, including shale 
gas, BC could enact policy to sustain development. While BC 
is unlikely to pursue such an option at present, it is worth 
noting that many energy-exporting states – including Nor-
way – maintain control over their resources through state-
owned corporations to ensure stability and greater agency 
with regard to regulation and revenue generation.17  
If it lives up to its full potential, shale gas development 
holds the potential to bring important regional economic 
benefits to Northern communities and First Nations who 
have been hit hard by the recent decline of other staples 
industries. According to Markey et al, “restructuring of both 
resource production and public service provision have meant 
that the past 20 years have been marked by accelerating 
instability, change, and job losses” (2006: 23). Both the 
economic impacts of the 1980s recession and the political 
implications of the neoliberal restraint policies that went 
with it had transformative effects on the political economy of 
Northern BC, abruptly ending what had been a multi-decade 
period of stable population growth and economic expansion. 
These communities have concurrently faced political hard-
ship: “rural places have suffered the increasing burden of 
decentralization and the off-loading of responsibilities to 
local governments by more senior levels of government 
without a concomitant transfer of fiscal resources to deal 
with those responsibilities” (Markey et al 2006: 26). Conse-
quently, Markey et al have argued that “communities in-
creasingly feel like they are ‘on their own,’” as “northerners 
speak nostalgically about the large-scale industrial invest-
ments witnessed across the region during the 1950s and 
1960s. These investments built the communications, eco-
nomic, and transportation infrastructure to support regional 
development, and northerners wish to see a contemporary 
equivalent of this economic vision and investment commit-
ment” (2007: 214-215). Northerners also felt that made-in-
the-North approaches offer greater potential for sustainabil-
ity, given the active public interest in ensuring long-term 
economic and environmental sustainability, and the value of 
local knowledge of ecosystems that could be transmitted to 
the decision-making process. Consequently, shale gas holds 
the potential to put an end to decades of rural decline and 
dissatisfaction from Northern communities, but only if it is 
developed in a way that incorporates “made in the North” 
decision-making processes, and puts the needs of Northern 
communities ahead of business (Markey et al 2007: 218). 
Alongside investment, shale gas could bring jobs to the 
North of the province, compensating for earlier job losses 
brought on by the decline of forestry and facilitating eco-
nomic revival in hard-hit resource communities. However, to 
do so would require a regulatory regime that promotes local 
job growth and investment under a sustainability- and de-
mocracy-oriented framework. It remains unclear whether 
shale gas will bring significant employment opportunities to 
the North. Unlike Alberta, which has the option to start 
expanding bitumen upgrader facilities in Edmonton to cre-
ate value-added jobs (Vanderklippe 2010), there are few 
potential areas of investment for value-added activity be-
yond natural gas liquification in Kitimat. This raises con-
cerns: is a potentially rigid and immature industry that 
offers little value-added economic potential appropriate for 
BC at its current stage of post-staples development? This 
concern must be adressed through local, democratic deci-
sion-making relating to industry development, and through 
a regulatory regime that prioritizes sustainable investment 
and employment prospects to the North of the province.  
The potential for northern development and job creation, 
sustainable investment, and provincial revenue suggests that 
shale gas could play a positive role in reinforcing and ad-
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vancing the post-staples development of BC’s economy, if 
regulated adequately. The Norwegian example reminds us 
that it is possible for a post-staples society to develop a sta-
ples industry without undermining the post-material and 
environmental values of large constituents in society, or 
frustrating the development of other economic sectors. 
Nonetheless, BC faces many challenges in balancing these 
positive goals with the plethora of risks identified above, 
which, although disparate, all embody the problem posed by 
an industry that represents a development trajectory incon-




Today, BC appears poised to embark on the development of 
a new staples resource in shale gas just as the province is 
beginning to locate a post-staples economic trajectory that 
coheres with its dynamic post-staples political imaginary. 
With strong tourism, film and high-tech sectors, it is unclear 
how or whether shale gas fits into this new economic picture 
that has evolved over the course of the past few decades 
through the political and normative challenges of resistive 
groups. Insofar as shale gas is deemed to mark a backward 
step in the economic, social, political, and environmental 
development of the province, it will incur staunch resistance 
from groups that have fought for the society which we now 
inhabit. To be a viable industry, shale gas must present itself 
as capable of delivering the same normative principles that 
flow from a post-staples imaginary. It must be developed in 
a way that advances the deliberative democratic process of a 
post-staples society, and the environmental stewardship and 
responsibility of a post-materialist axiology. It must generate 
economic benefits that reinforce sustainable growth and 
economic diversification, rather than economic dependency 
and a new staples trap. This will be a challenge, but for inspi-
ration the province can look to other states that have more 
successfully reconciled a staples industry with a post-staples 
trajectory. It can be done, but more importantly, it must be 
done. The alternatives will only bring the province economic 
regression, political conflict, and environmental shame. 
Averting this struggle is in the interests of the province, 
British Columbians, and indeed industry, which will other-
wise struggle to reap long-term stable profits in a toxic polit-
ical context. Important decisions now rest with the province: 
develop a sound regulatory regime capable of overcoming 
the disparate challenges associated with a staples industry 
situated in a post-staples society, or risk creating an industry 
that will lock BC into unstable economic dependency and a 
new staples trap; political resource-use struggles; First Na-
tions resistance; local environmental degradation; and repu-
tational damage to BC’s climate change leadership. Whatev-
er choices the province makes, its decisions on shale gas will 
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Endnotes 	  
1  Shale gas is a type of unconventional natural gas extracted from 
shale deposits 500 to 1500 metres below the earth’s surface. The 
gas is usually extracted through a process called hydraulic frac-
turing (“fracking”), where water, sand and chemicals are 
pumped into wells with extreme pressure, cracking open the 
shale rock and releasing natural gas molecules. Shale gas has re-
cently been discovered in large quantities in the American Mid-
west and Southwest, the Northeast of British Columbia, North-
ern Alberta, and in many other places including China, France, 
Poland and the UK, and is expected to account for a growing 
proportion of global natural gas output over the coming dec-
ades. 
2  As of 2009, 90 percent of royalties generated from the sale of 
drilling rights were related to shale gas, to a total of $2.4 billion 
in 2008, up from $885 million in 2007. However, the level fell 
drastically in 2009 and 2010 (see British Columbia Ministry of 
Energy and Mines, 2009; Adams, 2010). 
3  We remain agnostic on the question of whether the structural 
changes in the economy definitively render it “post-staples.” The 
changes are uneven, and their impacts difficult to assess at this 
point. See, for example, hesitations within Howlett and Brown-
sey (2008: 25-27) about how to characterize BC’s economy. 
However, we do think the trajectory of these changes bears con-	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sideration. We are more persuaded by the claim of a shift to a 
post-staples imaginary, as described below.  
4  According to Hutton, Canada is “at the advent of a post-staples 
state, in which resource extraction is increasingly seen by policy-
makers and the broader public as a residual of the national eco-
nomic structure, a vestige of a historical development path that 
sustained many Canadian regions and communities” (2008 : 
47). This post-staples state is characterized by the emergence of 
a metropolitan, post-Fordist, and transnational economy em-
bedded in a wider structural reality of neoliberal globalization, 
yet further characterized by a growing concern for environmen-
tal, cosmopolitan, and post-material values. Consequently, both 
these shifting normative and structural-economic realities have 
come to be internalized by policy-makers at multiple levels of 
government as a post-staples political economic paradigm. 
Again, we are intrigued by this paradigm, particularly insofar as 
analysis of it is rooted in the perceptions that shape public and 
policy responses to staples development.  
5  Forestry, for example, has declined as a proportion of provincial 
GPP, from 2.6% in 1998 to 1.2% in 2009, while the number of 
people employed in the industry has fallen by more than half, 
from 30,000 to 14,000 in that time span. (British Columbia 
Ministry of Finance, July 2010). 
6  BC’s progression from a staples to a mature staples to a post-
staples economy generally fits with the narrative of staples evo-
lution developed by Howlett and Brownsey (2008: 5-7), alt-
hough it is also different in that it has maintained a large export-
base of traditional staples despite seemingly being in transition 
from a mature staples to a post-staples economy. 
7  This was due to both the softwood lumber disputes and the 
destruction of forests by the mountain pine beetle. 
8  Fordist-Keynesian policies were most evident in the forestry 
sector, and were characterized by enormous public investments 
in roads; the appurtenancy condition, which mandated that re-
sources be processed in the same region where they were ex-
tracted; minimum logging requirements, which ensured that 
there would be work for loggers, even when market conditions 
alone might require layoffs; and partnerships between the pro-
vincial government and resource corporations to jointly build 
the infrastructure for new settlements, or communities, around 
these resource bases (Young 2008). 
9  The falling rate of profit was the overarching problem that 
caused a crisis of under-accumulation in many Northern econ-
omies in the mid-1970s, leading to inflation and economic stag-
nation. In structural terms, capital was unable to remain profit-
able, partly because it was paying labour too highly (leading to 
lower profits that were worth less and less with inflation), but 
also because there was too much constant capital involved in 
production. Neoliberalism “solved” this problem from a market 
perspective. Supply-side monetary policy, deregulation, privati-
zation and anti-labour policies seen in Britain, the United States 
and elsewhere enabled wages to fall, inflation to halt, and condi-
tions of profitability to be restored (Harvey 2005). However, the 
consequence was the sort of regulatory regime that had driven 
the BC economy forward in the Fordist-Keynesian era was no 
longer profitable.  	  
	  
10  Examples of this would include struggles over Clayoquot Sound 
(Magnusson and Shaw 2003) and the Great Bear Rainforest 
(Shaw 2004).  
11  This is not to presume that environmental movements and First 
Nations consistently work in concert, of course. There are con-
siderable differences in values, vision and strategy both between 
and within environmental movements and First Nations.  
12  The Enbridge Northern Gateway Pipeline will transport bitumen 
from the Athabasca oil sands to the port of Kitimat for export to 
East Asian markets, and transport condensate chemicals back to 




documentation of resistance to the Enbridge pipeline. 
13  Recent investments by Mitsubishi, Petronas and KOGAS, both 
in shale gas development and in LNG infrastructure, indicate 
that there is interest for BC’s natural gas in East Asian markets 
(CBC News 2011a; Japan Today 2011; Byers 2011). 
14  Oil fell from $134.44 in July 2008 to $31.84 per barrel in De-
cember 2008 (Energy Information Association, 2011).  
15  According to the Norges Bank of Investment Management, 
which manages Norway’s Government Pension Fund – Global, 
the fund was worth 3,077 NOK by 2010, which was worth $572 
billion US on June 7th, 2011. http://www.nbim.no/en/press-
and-publications/News-List/736/femte-beste-resultat-i-
fondets-historie/  
16  PetroChina has since withdrawn from a $5.5 billion deal with 
EnCana (Bellinski 2011).  
17  See for example Statoil in Norway as well as SOE’s in the Gulf 
States, and Petronas in Malaysia. 
